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The Arab conquest of the North African provinces and of the
East meant a huge financial loss for the Byzantine Empire. The
power balance seemed to shift in favor of the Caliphate. John Hal-
don, in The Empire That Would Not Die, emphasizes that the Byzan-
tine Empire did resist, albeit within new more limited boundaries,
because of the political and social transformations it underwent in
the seventh century. The Islamic caliphate, it should be noted, in-
creasingly spiralled into rebellion and political fragmentation,
which became evident in particular in the ninth century. Taking
inspiration from Haldon’s reflections in his book, this article en-
deavors to contribute to the debate on these issues. For reasons of
space and economy, it cannot quote sources extensively, but will
refer to other published research.
One of the crucial changes for the Empire was that provincial
elites rose to prominence, and became more deeply involved not
only in the administrative structure but also in the symbolic and
ideological universe of the East Roman Empire (pp. 73-74, 189-192).
This was the stratum from which fiscal and managerial officers
were usually drawn. A novel of Justin II in 569 makes clear that
the provincial governors were to be appointed by landlords and
bishops of the provinces. These groups were able to rise to the level
of the international, multiprovincial late Roman elite that held the
highest military offices, an elite largely composed of the old sena-
torial establishment. As Haldon puts it: “With the vast losses of
The End of an Era? The Impact of Early
Islamic Expansion on Economic and Social




04.4-campopiano_139_150.qxp_04.4-campopiano_139_150  09/10/17  13:05  Pagina 139
territory incurred by the state and the accompanying damage in-
flicted on the property and sources of wealth of the highest level of
the senatorial establishment in the course of the seventh century, the
remaining provinces and their local elites – the strata from what both
the older curial elite had been drawn as well as the most prominent
provincial magnates – became far more important than hitherto to
the survival of the empire, and hence even more closely bound to
the capital and the imperial system” (pp. 162-163). As Haldon rightly
points out, some geographical advantages may have contributed to
this survival. The Taurus/anti-Taurus was an important frontier bar-
rier, but it was the Anatolian plateau beyond them that represented
the major challenge for the Arabs, being a very different geograph-
ical environment from the one to which the conquerors were accus-
tomed (pp. 63-66). By contrast, although climatic fluctuations made
some agricultural activities more difficult, East Roman society was
flexible enough to adapt to safer modes of agrarian economy on the
plateau, and the government to rethink the ways it supplied its
armies (pp. 219-248).
The role of cities changed and they lost the central administra-
tive functions they had performed in the late Roman Empire: large
cities shrank, and now “only Constantinople could serve as a focus
for acquiring wealth, status, and power” (p. 194). Taxation, and in
particular land tax, delivered the crucial financial support to the East
Roman Empire. This continued into the seventh and eighth cen-
turies, but, as Haldon observes, tax collection was placed under
more direct palatine oversight (p. 72-73). This process went hand in
hand with another development: East Roman armies were increas-
ingly rooted in local society and recruited regionally from peasant
communities, and their unit and brigade commanders were largely
members of local elites (pp. 149-150). The Empire succeeded in root-
ing military organization and tax extraction in local society, and also
in cementing them within the administration of a large empire, with
local elites receiving highest imperial offices, empire-wide mobility
of top office-holders, and imperial oversight on taxation.
Haldon also believes that the Caliphate was unable to throw all
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the resources of its newly acquired provinces into the struggle with
the Empire owing to the “devolved nature of both taxation and
provincial government” (p. 30). The members of the Islamic commu-
nity registered in the dīwān drew their ‘aṭā’ (salary) from the province
in which they established themselves with the conquest. In their ad-
ministration, the Arabs often maintained a substantial continuity with
their Byzantine and Sasanian predecessors, including the involvement
of landed elites and administrators rooted in the previous regimes
and the use of Greek, Coptic and Pahlavi in administration.1
In Iraq, the heartland of the Sasanian empire prior to the Islamic
conquest, the landed elite of the Persian dahāqīn (we use here the
Arab version of the Middle-Persian word dehgan) stood surety for
the taxes on their land: their village estates represented the prevail-
ing form of land tenure in post-conquest Iraq.2 Village estates under
the control of dahāqīn were the normal units of agricultural produc-
tion and taxation at the time of the Arab conquest: dahāqīn helped in
the collection of surplus and its transmission to the state in the form
of taxes.3 This role was actually due to transformations that had
taken place in the late Sasanian empire during the wave of reforms
initiated by Kawād (r. 488-496 and 498-531) and implemented by
Husraw (r. 531-579), which strengthened the role of local landed
elites in the administration of the Empire and made the dahāqīn the
keeper of the Empire’s administrative and political traditions.4 These
reforms may have been connected to the wave of disorders usually
associated with the religious reformer Mazdak, which may in turn
have sprung from peasant resistance to the overwhelming power of
the highest aristocracy. However, landed elites were already starting
to change in the first decades after the Muslim conquest. I have an-
alyzed this process in greater detail elsewhere, but it is worth men-
tioning here that one of the key developments was the establishment
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of landed elites that obtained large grants of land thanks to their po-
litical connections with the ruling dynasties, lands on which they
paid lower taxes than the local landed gentry. This, together with
the overexploitation of these lands by elites, who could easily find
new sources of power or were replaced by changes in the ruling dy-
nasties, led to a decline in tax revenues for the Caliphate and to a
deterioration in soil conditions in Iraq.5
I turn now to issues of taxation, administration and elites in
three areas that had been under Byzantine rule but were conquered
by the Arabs in the course of the seventh century: Egypt, Syria-Pales-
tine (including most of present-day Israel and Jordan), and North
Africa more widely.
Egypt
The case of early Islamic Egypt presents a similar continuity of
tax collection practices. The hierarchy of provincial administration
was transmitted largely intact from the Byzantine period to the early
Islamic: the Byzantine pagarchies, which succeeded the nomes of the
fourth century, continued to exist as administrative subdivisions,
Arabic kūras. Probably as early as the sixth century, the role assigned
to administrators of town councils (curiales) diminished, and elites
retreated to their rural estates. Large country estates took over the
role of town councils, almost becoming semi-independent centers
of rule. The Byzantine pagarchs belonged to this landholding class.6
This continued after the Islamic conquest, although the Arabs did
carefully supervise tax administration and introduce some innova-
tions. In particular, Arabs penetrated the upper echelons of provin-
cial administration (and introduced new offices as well), yet few
families were able to establish real administrative dynasties.7 Tax al-
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location, however, was not dealt with at the level of the pagarchy
anymore. The governor or the dux (subordinate to the governor) al-
located tax quotas. The pagarch merely forwarded tax demands; the
landholding elite inherited from the Byzantine period was more
heavily subordinated to the provincial government.8 Governors
were appointed by the Caliph, but these nominations could be chal-
lenged by the local Egyptian Arab elites, who always preferred gov-
ernors drawn from their ranks.9
More radical changes seem to have occurred in the eighth cen-
tury. With Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705), Arabic started to be
used more extensively as a language of administration. Arabs began
to replace local officials in tax collection, and tax assessment focused
on individuals rather than villages. We also find the recompilation
of traditions concerning land conquered by Muslims. Egypt was de-
fined as conquered by ‘anwa  (military force without a treaty) and li-
able to pay the highest land-tax rates, which of course translated into
more stable funding to pay the ‘aṭā’.10 The role of the old landed gen-
try, as well its financial wealth, was again seriously diminished. Si-
jpesteijn has interpreted the changes of the early eighth century as
essentially “a restoration and tightening of the old, Byzantine ad-
ministrative system of Egypt as well as an attempt to improve the
system by closer Muslim and central control”. In her view, it is also
indisputable that the tax burden increased.11 The eighth century was
punctuated by revolts: these increasingly involved Arab Muslim
landholders as well, since they were required to pay heavy land
taxes comparable to those levied on the rest of the population.12
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Syria-Palestine
As Haldon points out, the failure of the Empire to protect cities
in Syria threatened by the Arabs was crucial, and resulted in the sur-
render or flight of their elites (p. 198). However, the situation of elites
in Syria-Palestine was probably being transformed well before the
Arab conquest. Cities and their curiales lost their central administra-
tive role from at least the sixth century.13 Kennedy shows that several
Syrian aristocrats (in the late sixth and early seventh centuries) com-
bined landownership with the exercise of a governing authority (he
talks of quasi-governmental powers) over their large estates: a situ-
ation reminiscent of that already described in Egypt. A number of
small towns and estates were owned by magnates who were also re-
sponsible, to some degree, for their defense.14 In addition, these mag-
nates may have run the fiscal administration. This elite may have
survived the Sasanian occupation or else returned afterward. New
inhabitants settled, in particular under Mu‘āwiya, and some were
given qaṭā’i‘ or property grants. These were given out of tithe lands,
which we are told came from abandoned estates. Some of the old
elites, including religious elites, may have left Syria.15 Some may
have reinvented themselves as mawālī, in particular as mawālī of the
Caliph (non-Arab converts to Islam), playing a major role in the ad-
ministration of the region and of the Umayyad Caliphate in general.
However, unlike Sasanian elites, they did not bear the memory of
their pre-Islamic origin. The Sasanian elites brought with them the
tradition of Sasanian kingship and administration, whereas memo-
ries of Roman government seem not to have been revived by the de-
scendants of the pre-Islamic elites. Kennedy concludes: “It seems as
if the Rūm, old hellenised ruling class, lost their status and identity,
either by death in battle, emigration or by merging themselves in
the new order as mawālī of the Umayyads”.16
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As in Iraq, Islamic elites, protagonists of the conquest or linked
to the ruling clans of the Caliphate, increasingly acquired country
estates in Syria-Palestine beginning with Caliph ‘Uthmān (r. 644-
656). A popular area was the Darum, a region of steppes in southern
Palestine east of Ascalon, where ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, “Conqueror of
Palestine,” acquired an estate called ‘Ajlan.17 In particular, river val-
leys were increasingly occupied, while other sites were abandoned.
New settlements in Syria may have been created at the expense of
marginal zones.18 In other cases, new estates belonging to Islamic
elites may have been established where previous settlements existed.
Long irrigation canals were dug on large agricultural estates owned
by members of the ruling Umayyad family.19 The rise of desert cas-
tles in areas dominated by Umayyad dynasties in present-day Jor-
dan, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, such as Qaṣr al-Ḥayr ash-Sharqī and
Qaṣr Ḥayr al-Gharbī, is to some extent a related development.20 The
wealth of the new elites was largely dependent on dynastic or fac-
tional political support: some abandonments and abatements can be
explained in Syria by a shift of political fortunes when the Abbasids
succeeded the Umayyads.21
North Africa
North Africa had played a crucial role in the grain and oil annona
for Rome, supplying the Eternal City with essential agricultural
products. After the Vandal conquest of Carthage in 439, this connec-
tion with the Roman heartland was severed. Changes may be de-
tected at different levels. The Vandals continued taxation, but in
Africa we also notice an end of city-based taxation: taxation was
probably increasingly centralized at the level of the capital, as in the
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Eastern Empire.22 Vandal elites quickly adopted the lifestyle of late
Roman gentry, settling down and acquiring property in the coun-
tryside.23 The Vandals probably also settled on sortes (land-shares)
and received exemption from taxation in exchange for military ser-
vice.24
After the Byzantines conquered North Africa, grain shipments
(this time to Constantinople) resumed.25 In Byzantine North Africa
civil and military administration were sometimes unified, a fusion
formalized with the creation of the rank of exarch at the end of the
sixth century.26 The province was highly militarized. The highest-
ranking officials of the province often hailed from the Persian and
Balkan borderlands, and it is likely that subordinate officers were also
largely of eastern origin, at least in Justinian’s reign. So the highest
civil servants and military commanders were generally “foreigners”
and often had close ties to the emperor.27 Heavy taxation under the
Byzantines probably facilitated the progress of the Arab conquest.
The leading members of the administration continued to be mainly
non-African elites, and the Byzantines were incapable of delivering
continuous military support to the far-flung region. They demanded
increasing revenues from Africa while failing to create an essential
identity of interest between the empire and North Africans. We have
references to discontent among Roman landholders.28 As Kaegi
writes, “The Byzantines failed to develop a strategy that coordinated
imperial interests with those of local Romanized inhabitants of North
Africa”. No evidence of a thematic reform in late-seventh-century
North Africa exists.29 We have no record of a system of land grants
to support the military. Resistance to the Arabs remained mostly frag-
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mented and the Byzantines failed to develop a strategy to harness
the strength of autochthonous tribes in Numidia, who essentially re-
sisted Byzantine rule.30 The Arabs recruited among the Berbers, but,
like their Byzantine predecessors, they also had difficulty assimilat-
ing them. As Kennedy puts it, in Ifrīqiya (the area roughly compris-
ing Tunisia, Tripolitania and East Algeria) the governor “had to be
able to defeat or win over the Berbers, while at the same time retain-
ing the loyalty of the local jund (militia), always concentrated to retain
its privileged status. This meant that the choice of governors was lim-
ited to those with roots in and contacts in the provinces”.31 Berbers
refused to pay taxes, which were necessary to pay salaries to the jund.
The Umayyad taxed the area heavily, whereas Arab settlements were
limited. In the late Umayyad period North Africa witnessed the
spread of Kharijism in its different forms. Kharijites, too, refused to
pay taxes and had significant success among the Berbers. Sufrite
Kharijites led a rebellion in 740. An ‘Ibadi rebellion with broad Berber
support seized Qayrawān in 758. This meant that North Africa held
no allegiance to the Caliphate. The Abbasids had to send an expedi-
tion of 40,000 Khurasani soldiers to retake North Africa. Another
Khariji rebellion (768-771) wrested the region again from Abbasid
rule. In the event, under the Abbasids the jund remained hard to man-
age. This can be seen in the period of the Barmakid hegemony, when
Harthama ibn A‘yan was appointed governor, and, after him
Muḥammad ibn Muqātil Al-‘Akkī: the latter was deposed by a mili-
tary uprising in 799, probably because he ordered a lowering of the
taxes paid to the jund. This led to the rise of Ibrāhīm ibn al-A’ghlab
in 800, who was confirmed in office by Caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd. After
his accession, the Abbasids lost their power to appoint and dismiss
governors of the province. Ibrāhīm ibn al-A’ghlab agreed to pay
40,000 dirhams a year to Baghdad, major financial relief given that
the province had cost the Abbasids about 100,000 a year. He again
had to negotiate a complex relationship with the jund, and also re-
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cruited a bodyguard of about 5,000 black slaves. The jund rebelled
again in 810 because of unpaid salaries and the importing of a slave
army.32 After the Abbasid civil war, North Africa effectively became
independent at the beginning of the ninth century.
Conclusion
If the resilience of the Byzantine Empire after the dramatic
changes in the seventh century can be explained to a large extent by
the successful balancing of local roots and imperial interests across
its elites, a large part of the troubles of the Islamic caliphate can be
explained by the lack thereof. My hypothesis is that the elites of the
Arab caliphates were either deeply connected to dynastic and impe-
rial interests, or rooted in their provincial status quo.33 Even within a
single province, conflict arose over the distribution of landed re-
sources, extracted through the dyad tax/rent and distributed in dif-
ferent forms. By the ninth century, the Abbasid regime did not
represent a variety of constituencies and interest groups in the em-
pire. As Kennedy puts it, “Most Muslims had no direct involvement
with the ruling elite, and were subjects of Abbasid power, rather than
stakeholders in it”.34 The creation of a new military elite, recruited
primarily from among the Turks and other marginal groups, relying
solely on salaries and settled in the heartland of the Caliphate with-
out having any roots in them, compounded the problem.35 The pre-
vious military system based on the payment of ‘atā’ to the jund often
produced similar problems, with the jund struggling to gain control
over the revenues of their provinces, as we have seen with the unruly
militia of North Africa. As I have shown in previous articles, the de-
cline in revenues from Iraq, the heartland of the Empire, also fol-
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lowed from the Caliphate’s inability to harness the resources of the
rich alluvium. The interests of specific elite groups, who rose to
wealth and influence through political support, prevailed. The para-
dox of East Roman survival is largely attributable, as Haldon ex-
plains, to the fact that “the vested interests of the elite in the widest
sense […] coincided with the survival of the Roman state” (p. 291).
This is an important lesson for the study of pre-modern polities, a
lesson that can be better understood by viewing such polities using
a theoretical framework developed by Haldon himself – that of the
tributary mode of production. The tributary mode of production is
based on a system of surplus extraction from peasant production that
ultimately relies on coercion. “Tax” and “rent” are two possible forms
taken by this coercive surplus extraction: there is no economic differ-
ence between the two concepts, “For both sides of the couplet
tax/rent are, in fact, expressions of the political-juridical forms that
surplus appropriation takes, not distinct modes [of production].”36
This perspective also allows new insights into the relationship be-
tween patterns of surplus extraction, as expressed in the couplet
tax/rent, and social conflicts. Social conflicts in the tributary mode
of production may arise from the contraposition of different social
groups within the ruling classes regarding access to the surplus in the
form of rents or salaries paid from the taxes. The ruling class can ap-
propriate land surplus by taking control of portions of land and
therefore receive rents paid by the peasants cultivating the land (as,
for example in the Carolingian Empire), or by redistributing taxes to
a ruling group in the form of salary (as in the case of payment to
Arabs after the conquest).37 In the Islamic caliphates, provincial elites
(and different elites within the provinces) and the central adminis-
tration clashed over the division of the economic surplus. It seems to
me, following Haldon’s narrative, that the Byzantine empire was able
to create a solidarity of interests in the extraction and distribution of
surplus between local elite and the Roman state.
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